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SPECIAL FEATURES
PROGRESS IN SELF-DETERMINATION: NAVIGATING
FUNDING FOR ISDA CONTRACTS AFTER SALAZAR v.
RAMAH NAVAJO CHAPTER*
Steven L. Mangold**
In the recently decided Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 1 the Supreme
Court held that when Congress appropriates a sufficient amount of funds
for any one contractor for contract support costs under a lump-sum
appropriation for contracts under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”), 2 but an insufficient amount to cover
all contractors under that sum, the government is liable for the shortfall. If
Congress does not reform the ISDA funding structure, it will subject the
government to liability any time it under-appropriates because it has
promised full contract support funding for any qualifying self-determination
contract. Thus, Congress has an incentive to retract this promise of full
funding in order to avoid liability by eliminating either the mandate to
provide full contract support costs or the mandate to accept every
qualifying contract, as noted by the Supreme Court in Ramah. Other
congressional responses could limit tribal contractors’ funding as well, such
as line-item appropriations, as suggested by the Tenth Circuit, or limits on
the rate of indirect-cost reimbursement, as noted by a 1999 General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) (now Government Accountability Office)
Report addressing the shortfall.
This Note argues that Congress should reject such responses that would
weaken the ISDA and threaten the benefits it confers to Indian tribes who
rely on ISDA contracts to manage their healthcare, law enforcement, and
education programs. Rather, Congress should consider solutions to the
funding problem that strengthen the ISDA, namely (1) direct spending
* First-place winner, 2012-13 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
** J.D., 2014, The University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., 2011, Dordt College.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975). The Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act is comprised of two titles: Title I, the Indian Self-Determination
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (2012), and Title II, the Indian Education Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 455-458e (2012). Authorities have variously referenced the overall Act in short
form by using the acronyms “ISDA” and “ISDEAA.” This Note will use “ISDA” in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s practice in Ramah.
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authorizations to federal agencies for ISDA contracts, (2) consolidation of
direct and indirect program costs in ISDA contracts, and (3) costreimbursement incentive-type contract schemes. These solutions respect the
self-determination policy underlying the ISDA by providing tribes with
more control over their programs; incentivizing contractors to keep costs
low by running efficient, effective programs; and limiting Congress’s
ability to appropriate insufficient ISDA funding. Therefore, Salazar v.
Ramah Navajo Chapter can be a catalyst for the federal government to
fulfill its obligations to American Indian tribes and, with the proper
congressional response, become an opportunity to strengthen the ISDA
program and enhance the progress of American Indian tribes in selfdetermination.
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I. Introduction
The ISDA allows Indian tribes to contract with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”) and the Indian Health Service (“IHS”) for provision of
services such as health care, education, and law enforcement. 3 Out of their
congressionally appropriated discretionary funds, the BIA and IHS allocate
to the tribally administered contracts the amount of funds the agencies
“would otherwise have provided” in the absence of such self-determination
contracts. 4 The ISDA further provides that tribes receive funding for
“contract support costs” (“CSCs”)—their administrative and other indirect
costs associated with running the federally funded programs. 5 All funds for
self-determination contracts and their CSCs are “subject to the availability
of appropriations.” 6
Congress supplies funds for the ISDA through a “lump-sum”
appropriation to the BIA and the IHS under the Department of the Interior
(“DOI”) and the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”),
respectively. 7 The Secretaries of these agencies allocate out of these
discretionary funds the amounts required to fulfill obligations for

3. See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1) (“The amount of funds provided under the terms of selfdetermination contracts . . . shall not be less than the appropriate Secretary would have
otherwise provided for the operation of the programs or portions thereof for the period
covered by the contract . . . .”).
5. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2187 (2012) (5-4 decision)
(describing the funding arrangement for CSCs for contracts entered into under the ISDA
model contract as “‘[s]ubject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary shall make
available to the Contractor the total amount specified in the annual funding agreement’
between the Secretary and the tribe. That amount ‘shall not be less than the applicable
amount determined pursuant to [§ 450j-1(a)],’ which includes contract support costs.”
(citations omitted) (quoting 25 U.S.C § 450l(c) (section 1(b)(4) of the model agreement))).
See also infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b) (“Notwithstanding any other provision in this subchapter, the
provision of funds under this subchapter is subject to the availability of appropriations . . .
.”). This language became important to the tribes’ litigation over unpaid CSCs. See infra
notes 13, 60–61, 85–89 and accompanying text.
7. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2190; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
1393–96 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S
HANDBOOK]; see also Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-291, 114 Stat. 922 (2000) (appropriating funds to the BIA “[f]or expenses
necessary for the operation of Indian programs, as authorized by law, including . . . the
[ISDA] . . . $1,741,212,000, to remain available until September 30, 2002 except as
otherwise provided herein . . . .”).
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contracting tribes’ direct program8 and contract support costs. 9 However,
Congress has often imposed a cap on the amount of funds a Secretary could
allocate for ISDA contract support costs. 10 The amount in this cap has been
sufficient to cover any tribe’s claim to its CSCs under an individual selfdetermination contract, but insufficient to cover the costs for all tribes’
contracts collectively. 11 Faced with a shortfall, the agencies have attempted
a pro rata distribution of the authorized funds, leaving tribes with less than
full reimbursement for their administrative and indirect expenses. 12
The tribes sued in several instances of litigation spanning the last
eighteen years. 13 The courts reached varying conclusions, but the D.C. and
8. See 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 6-21 to -22 (3d. ed. 2006) (discussing the fiscal years at
issue in the Cherokee litigation, saying, “The contracts . . . were funded from lump-sum
appropriations to the Indian Health Service that . . . far exceeded the total payments due
under the contracts and contained no restrictions . . . .”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29,
Ramah, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (No. 11-551), 2011 WL 5145757 at *29 (“According to agency
data, nearly 40% of the BIA’s annual budget for social and economic programs for Indian
tribes is administered directly by tribal organizations under ISDA self-determination
contracts.”).
9. See, e.g., Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-291, 114 Stat. 922 (2000) (appropriating a lump sum to the BIA that included but
limited an amount payable for CSCs).
10. Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2187 (quoting Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999)) (discussing each
fiscal year relevant to the litigation and saying that “Congress provided that ‘not to exceed [a
particular amount] shall be available for payments to tribes . . . for contract support costs’
under ISDA.”). See also infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
11. Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2187 (“During each relevant [fiscal year], Congress
appropriated sufficient funds to pay in full any individual tribal contractor's contract support
costs. Congress did not, however, appropriate sufficient funds to cover the contract support
costs due all tribal contractors collectively.”).
12. Id. (“Between [fiscal year] 1994 and 2001, appropriations covered only between
77% and 92% of tribes' aggregate contract support costs. The extent of the shortfall was not
revealed until each fiscal year was well underway, at which point a tribe's performance of its
contractual obligations was largely complete. . . . Lacking funds to pay each contractor in
full, the Secretary paid tribes' contract support costs on a uniform, pro rata basis.”).
13. See, e.g., Ramah, 132 S. Ct. 2181, aff’g Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d
1054 (10th Cir. 2011), and abrogating Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005); S. Ute Indian Tribe v.
Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2011); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Thompson, 279 F.3d
660 (9th Cir. 2001); Babbitt v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Pub. Safety Dep’t, 194 F.3d 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1997); Ramah Navajo
Sch. Bd. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Arctic Slope, 629 F.3d at 1298
(“This case is the latest in a long-running dispute between the various Indian tribes and the
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Federal Circuits held that the fact that the contracts were subject to the
availability of appropriations (as most government contracts are) or the
existence of the statutory cap meant the tribes were entitled only to what
Congress appropriated, and therefore only to what the agencies
distributed. 14 In Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, the Supreme Court reversed
this trend by holding that when Congress appropriated enough unrestricted
funds (i.e., without the statutory cap) for any one tribal contractor, but not
enough for all tribes collectively, the “subject to the availability of
appropriations” language did not bar recovery for the tribes. 15 In Salazar v.
Ramah Navajo Chapter, the Court reaffirmed Cherokee in a case where
Congress did impose a statutory cap restricting the agencies’ allocation of
funds for CSCs. Ramah held the tribes could still recover because the
government had limited only what the agencies could do with the funds, not
its ultimate liability for underfunding the contracts. 16
Secretary concerning the Secretary’s obligation to pay contract support costs.”); Lloyd B.
Miller, A Most Unusual Alliance: Indian Tribes and Military Contractors Vindicate First
Principles in the Ramah Litigation, FED. LAW., Oct./Nov. 2012, at 48, 48–49 (“The
persistence of the underpayments, sometimes totaling millions of dollars for individual tribal
contractors, produced considerable litigation and conflicting circuit court opinions,
compelling the Supreme Court to step in not once, but twice.” (footnote omitted)).
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that “the D.C. and Federal
Circuits have both recognized, the ‘unequivocal statutory language’ of Section 450j1(b) forecloses any contention that the ISDA guarantees full funding of contract support
costs ‘as a matter of right.’” (citations omitted)).
15. See Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 637 (“[A]s long as Congress has appropriated sufficient
legally unrestricted funds to pay the contracts at issue, the Government normally cannot
back out of a promise to pay on grounds of ‘insufficient appropriations,’ even if the contract
uses language such as ‘subject to the availability of appropriations,’ and even if an agency’s
total lump-sum appropriation is insufficient to pay all the contracts the agency has made.”
(citation omitted)). The Court in Cherokee also noted that “subject to the availability of
appropriations,” ordinarily interpreted, means only that “an agency and a contracting party
can negotiate a contract prior to the beginning of a fiscal year but that the contract will not
become binding unless and until Congress appropriates funds for that year.” Id. at 643. Thus,
the phrase prevents agency contracting officers from binding the government absent
congressional approval through appropriations, and “[s]ince Congress appropriated adequate
unrestricted funds here, [the “subject to availability” clause] would not help the
Government.” Id.; see also id. at 647 (concluding that the appropriations “provision[s] do[]
not bar recovery here”); infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
16. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2190 (“The principles underlying Cherokee Nation and
Ferris [upon which Cherokee relied] dictate the result in this case.”); id. at 2191–92
(rejecting the government’s attempt to distinguish Cherokee from Ramah on the presence of
the “not too exceed” language that placed a cap on what the Secretary could allocate for
contract support costs because the effect of that language was to “prevent[] the Secretary
from reprogramming other funds to pay contract support costs—thereby protecting funds
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This Note critiques Congress’s possible responses, delineated in the
Ramah decision and a 1999 General Accounting Office, now Government
Accountability Office, (“GAO”) report, that would undercut the ISDA by
eliminating its full CSC funding promise, and argues that Congress and the
federal agencies should instead strengthen the ISDA to provide tribes with
more control over their ISDA funds, incentivize them to keep costs low,
and limit congressional ability to underfund the entire program. Part II
discusses the ISDA, funding schemes for CSCs, and the Cherokee and
Ramah litigation. Part III evaluates and assesses critically the various
options available to Congress noted by Ramah and the GAO in limiting
liability for shortfalls in ISDA funding, determining that none of the
proposed responses adequately meets the needs and goals of the ISDA. Part
IV argues for a more robust solution, involving program-strengthening
reforms to the ISDA, including a more flexible funding scheme in the form
of direct spending authorization, direct program and contract support cost
consolidation, and administering cost-reimbursement, incentive-type
contracts. These are needed to fulfill the federal government’s obligation to
American Indian tribes and to meet the ISDA’s self-determination goals.
II. Self-Determination Contracts and the Ramah Dispute
The litigation that culminated in the Ramah decision conjoined several
distinct but interrelated areas of the law: the ISDA statute and its provisions
regarding CSC funding, appropriations law and the methods Congress has
employed to fund ISDA contracts and their support costs, and principles of
government contracting law underlying the tribes’ win in Ramah. 17 This
Part explores each area in turn.
A. The ISDA and Contract Support Costs
The United States federal government and the Native American Indian
tribes within U.S. territory share a very special, historically dependent

that Congress envisioned for other BIA programs, including tribes that choose not to enter
ISDA contracts. But when an agency makes competing contractual commitments with
legally available funds and then fails to pay, it is the Government that must bear the fiscal
consequences, not the contractor. . . . The agency’s allocation choices do not affect the
Government’s liability in the event of an underpayment.”); see also infra notes 102–09 and
accompanying text.
17. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2186 (“Consistent with longstanding principles of
Government contracting law, we hold that the Government must pay each tribe’s contract
support costs in full.”). See generally Miller, supra note 12.
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relationship. 18 One of the principal aspects of this affiliation is the trustee–
fiduciary relationship, a doctrine developed over centuries from original
treaties and statutes, as well as court opinions, which often sought to justify
federal use of Indian lands. 19 More recently, the trust relationship has been
construed as a limitation on the federal government in dealing with Indian
tribes, preventing it from enacting destructive policies, but also justifying
certain positive regulations. 20 For Congress, however, the limit is only
“prudential” in that challenges to congressional action cannot rely on the
trust relationship alone, but must invoke a constitutional basis. 21
Nevertheless, “Congress takes the trust responsibility seriously,” and it is a
“persuasive” and “motivating factor” for congressional action relating to
Indian tribes. 22
Since the second half of the twentieth century, federal agencies such as
the BIA and the IHS have administered and provided services such as
health care, education, and law enforcement to Indian tribes and tribal
organizations. 23 “In 1970, only 1.5% of BIA programs for Indians and only
2.4% of IHS programs were administered by Indian tribes and
organizations.” 24 The policy reflected not only the view that “the federal
government has a trust and treaty-based responsibility” to take care of the
Indian tribes by providing such services, but also an erroneous “widespread
belief throughout much of U.S. history that Indians were incapable of
providing these services for themselves.” 25
18. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 5 (“To understand twenty-first century
Native American legal issues, one must be familiar with developments often dating back to
the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. A wealth of seemingly non-legal data
affects the legal relationship between Indians and the federal government. Furthermore,
Indian law draws on disciplines as varied as anthropology, sociology, psychology, political
science, economics, philosophy, and religion. The most significant of these sources is
history.” (footnotes omitted)).
19. Id. at 412.
20. Id. at 415.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 416.
23. Id. at 1386; Addie Rolnick, Why Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter Is More than
Simply a Federal Contracting Case, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 28, 2012, 4:25 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/why-salazar-v-ramah-navajo-chapter-ismore-than-simply-a-federal-contracting-case.html (recounting that until the ISDA, the U.S.
policies toward Indian tribes “favor[ed] pervasive (and remote) federal control over almost
every aspect of reservation life, from health care to policing schools to natural resource
management.”).
24. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1386.
25. Rolnick, supra note 23.
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In 1970, President Nixon instituted a new policy—continued by every
president since—that would allow tribes to administer directly the programs
affecting them: “Self-determination without termination.” 26 This new vision
acknowledged the history between the United States and the Indian tribes
by affirming the trust and treaty-based obligations, but it discarded the idea
of “Indian incompetence” by allowing tribes to determine for themselves
how to administer their own programs and serve their communities. 27
Thus, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (“ISDA”) in 1975 with the following findings:
The Congress, after careful review of the Federal government’s
historical and special legal relationship with, and resulting
responsibilities to, American Indian people, finds that-(1) the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service
programs has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of
Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of the
full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the
realization of self-government, and has denied to the Indian
people an effective voice in the planning and implementation of
programs for the benefit of Indians which are responsive to the
true needs of Indian communities; and
(2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to
control their relationships both among themselves and with nonIndian governments, organizations, and persons. 28
26. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1386–87. “Termination” is the term denoting
the era from 1943 to 1961, in which the federal government instituted a “broad[] policy to
terminate the federal-tribal relationship.” Id. at 84, 86.
27. Id. at 1387; Rolnick, supra note 23.
28. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (2012). The statute goes on to specify education as a central
aspect of self-determination:
The Congress further finds that—
(1) true self-determination in any society of people is dependent upon an
educational process which will insure the development of qualified people to
fulfill meaningful leadership roles;
(2) the Federal responsibility for and assistance to education of Indian
children has not effected the desired level of educational achievement or
created the diverse opportunities and personal satisfaction which education can
and should provide; and
(3) parental and community control of the educational process is of crucial
importance to the Indian people.
Id. § 450(b).
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With these recognitions in mind, Congress articulated its new policy
towards Indian tribes in unequivocal terms:
(a) Recognition of obligation of United States
The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United
States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people
for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation
in the direction of educational as well as other Federal services
to Indian communities so as to render such services more
responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.
(b) Declaration of commitment
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the
Federal Government’s unique and continuing relationship with,
and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian
people as a whole through the establishment of a meaningful
Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly
transition from the Federal domination of programs for, and
services to, Indians to effective and meaningful participation by
the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of
those programs and services. In accordance with this policy, the
United States is committed to supporting and assisting Indian
tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal
governments, capable of administering quality programs and
developing the economies of their respective communities.
(c) Declaration of national goal
The Congress declares that a major national goal of the United
States is to provide the quantity and quality of educational
services and opportunities which will permit Indian children to
compete and excel in the life areas of their choice, and to achieve
the measure of self-determination essential to their social and
economic well-being. 29
The underlying goal of the ISDA is clear: to encourage tribal selfdetermination by empowering Indian tribes to provide and manage the
services essential to their members. 30
29. Id. § 450a.
30. Rolnick, supra note 23 (“Broadly, [the ISDA’s] purpose is to facilitate tribes’ ability
to control the programs and issues that affect their communities.”).
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To implement the transition from federally run programs to selfdetermination contracts, the ISDA directs the Secretary of either the DOI or
the HHS “upon the request of any Indian tribe . . . to enter into a selfdetermination contract” 31 with few exceptions, meaning that the
government must accept any qualifying contract from a tribe or tribal
organization. 32 Reflecting the history and purpose of the ISDA, the
programs are for those services formerly provided directly by the federal
government: among other things, “programs . . . for the benefit of Indians
because of their status as Indians without regard to the agency or office of
the [HHS] or the [DOI] within which it is performed.” 33 Such programs
have included typical BIA programs—“law enforcement, social services,
road maintenance, and forestry”—and typical IHS services such as
“hospitals and health clinics; mental health; dental care; and environmental
health services, such as sanitation.” 34
The tribes have responded earnestly, and “[t]oday, tribes administer more
than half of [their] programs.” 35 Tribal administration of these programs has
been fairly complete: in addition to subcontracting for the program services,
tribes “assume[] responsibility for all aspects of [program] management,
such as hiring program personnel, conducting program activities and
delivering program services, and establishing and maintaining
administrative and accounting systems.” 36 Moreover, there is evidence that
the tribes “have excelled in running contracted federal programs,” 37 and
they “have seen tremendous improvements in the quality and
31. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1) (“The Secretary [of the DOI or the HHS] is directed, upon
the request of any Indian tribe by tribal resolution, to enter into a self-determination contract
or contracts with a tribal organization to plan, conduct, and administer programs or portions
thereof . . . .”); id. § 450b(j) (“‘[S]elf-determination contract’ means a contract . . . entered
into . . . between a tribal organization and the appropriate Secretary for the planning, conduct
and administration of programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes and
their members pursuant to Federal law . . . .”).
32. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2195 (2012) (“Congress
obligated the Secretary to accept every qualifying ISDA contract . . . .”); COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1387 (noting that a Secretary may deny a tribe’s request for an
ISDA contract in limited situations).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)(E).
34. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-150, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
ACT : SHORTFALLS IN INDIAN CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 5 (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/227485.pdf [hereinafter 1999 GAO REPORT].
35. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1386.
36. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 5.
37. Miller, supra note 12, at 48 (citing Editorial, A Formula for Cutting Health
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2012, at SR10).
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responsiveness of programs, such as police, jails, and hospitals, since taking
them over under the ISDA.” 38
Originally, the federal agencies funded ISDA programs with the same
amount of funds that the Secretary of either agency would have allocated to
such programs if they were still under federal control: specifically, the
ISDA states that the amount “shall not be less than the appropriate
Secretary would have otherwise provided for the operation of the
programs . . . .”39 With regard to these “direct program” 40 funds, “financial
responsibility remains with the federal government,” even though program
control is transferred to tribes and tribal organizations. 41
However, under the original ISDA funding scheme, the federal
government did not cover overhead, administrative, and indirect costs. 42
Because the agencies were not running the programs, the tribes’ indirect
costs associated with administering ISDA contracts exceeded those the
federal government could minimize with its economies of scale for
management and infrastructure. 43 For example, the direct program funds

38. Rolnick, supra note 22.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1) (2012).
40. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 17 (observing that the funds for programs that
the Secretary would otherwise have provided are known as “direct program” funds).
41. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1393. In addition,
If a tribe operates the program more cheaply than the federal government did, it
can keep the savings and put them back into the program. Where the federal
government does not provide enough funding to perform the contract, the tribe
has the option to suspend the operation on reasonable notice to the appropriate
agency.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
42. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, §
106(h), 88 Stat. 2203, 2211-12 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450) (providing
for direct program costs but lacking provision for CSCs); see supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
43. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1393 (noting that administrative costs ate
up the tribe’s contractual funding); see also Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct.
2181, 2186 (2012) (“It soon became apparent that this secretarial amount failed to account
for the full costs to tribes of providing services.”); Rolnick, supra note 23 (“When the Act
was first passed, tribes received only the amount the agency would have directly allocated to
their program, but a lot of the program money was eaten up by indirect administrative costs,
for which the agencies generally did not reimburse tribes. For example, while the Indian
Health Service would have relied on its own administrative funding to cover overhead and
administrative costs of running a hospital on Tribe X’s reservation (e.g., liability insurance
and employee fringe benefits), Tribe X would only receive the amount directly allocated to
hospital programming, with the agency retaining its full administrative funding. Tribe X
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did not cover “‘federally mandated annual single-agency audits, liability
insurance, financial management systems, personnel systems, property
management and procurement systems and other administrative
requirements.’” 44 Without funding for these costs, “tribal resources ‘which
are needed for community and economic development must instead be
diverted to pay for the indirect costs associated with programs that are a
federal responsibility.’” 45 To remedy the problem, Congress amended the
ISDA in 1988 to provide for “contract support costs” in addition to the
general contract funds. 46
The ISDA carefully defines “contract support costs,” as those costs over
and above direct program costs—those “the appropriate Secretary would
have otherwise provided for the operation of the programs or portions
thereof for the period covered by the contract.”47 Contract support costs
include the tribal contractor’s “reasonable costs” incurred “to ensure
compliance with the terms of the contract and prudent management” but are
not “normally . . . carried on by the respective” agency or “are provided . . .
from resources other than those under contract.”48 Such costs include not
only the “direct program expenses” associated with a specific contract, but
also “any additional administrative or . . . overhead” costs connected to the
“program, function, service, or activity pursuant to the contract . . . .” 49
Elsewhere, the ISDA statute is more explicit in its requirement that CSCs
be fully funded: “Upon the approval of a self-determination contract, the
Secretary shall add to the contract the full amount of funds to which the
contractor is entitled under [§ 450j-1(a) of the ISDA] . . . .” 50 Thus, while
subject to the various determinations as to what comprises CSCs, Congress

might be forced to cover these overhead costs by cutting hospital services or laying off staff.
So Congress amended the ISDA to require the agencies to pay contract support costs.”).
44. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 100-274, at 8 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2627).
45. Id. at 1058 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 9 (1987), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2628).
46. See Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–472, § 205,
102 Stat. 2285, 2292–94 (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (providing for the funding of
contract support costs); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1394 (recounting Congress’s
amendment to include support costs).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1).
48. Id. § 450j-1(a)(2).
49. Id. § 450j-1(a)(3)(A). The statute further provides that the function for CSCs “shall
not duplicate” any funding the Secretary would otherwise have provided for direct programs.
Id.
50. Id. § 450j-1(g) (emphasis added by Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1058).
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perceived the tribal need for funding so acutely as to express the
requirements in the ISDA in terms of entitlement. 51
CSCs include “both direct program expenses and administrative and
other overhead expenses,” which the BIA and IHS have broken down into
three distinct categories: “[i]ndirect costs,” “[d]irect contract support costs,”
and “[s]tartup costs.” 52 Indirect costs are associated with overhead costs for
administering the programs and managing the contracts. 53 They are not
associated with any particular program, but rather typically include costs
such as “financial and personnel management, property and records
management, data processing and office services, utilities, janitorial
services, building and grounds maintenance, insurance, and legal
services.” 54 In contrast, direct contract support costs are associated with
particular programs, including: the “[c]osts of activities that are not
contained in either the indirect cost pool or the direct program funds,”
typically including “training required to maintain the certification of direct
program personnel and the costs related to direct program salaries, such as
unemployment taxes, workers’ compensation insurance, and retirement
costs.” 55 Finally, startup costs are the one-time costs associated with
beginning a new program, such as purchasing equipment, hiring staff, and
setting up administrative facilities and systems. 56
Combining the figures for all such costs, the BIA and the IHS fund CSCs
according to a formula that adds direct contract support costs to the indirect
costs (determined according to a negotiated rate multiplied by the total
51. The Tenth Circuit emphasized the obligation-inducing nature of the statutory
language. See Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1058–59 (referring to tribal contractors’ claim to contract
funding as an “entitlement” after reviewing the various statutory provisions for contract
support cost funding).
52. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 17–18 & tbl.1.1; see also id. at 25 n.1 (“The
legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act discloses that the Congress substituted ‘contract support costs’ for ‘contract
costs’ in the provision prescribing funding of reasonable costs to manage the contracts. It
specifically chose not to use ‘direct and indirect’ costs when describing what these costs
cover. In the 1996 joint agency regulations, contract support costs include direct costs,
startup costs, and indirect contract costs. Prior to the regulations, it was the agencies’
practice to use the term indirect costs as the largest component of contract support costs.”).
53. See id. at 18 tbl.1.1.
54. Id. (noting that “[t]here is no universal rule for classifying certain costs as either
direct or indirect under every accounting system. The types of costs classified as indirect
costs may vary by tribe depending on its particular circumstances.” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
55. Id.
56. See id.
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direct program costs) and any identifiable startup costs. 57 In all, direct
program funds are the same year after year, unless there is a change in what
BIA or IHS would have budgeted for those programs if it ran them, but
CSCs vary from year to year depending on the indirect cost rate and the
presence of startup costs. 58 Indirect costs comprise the majority of CSCs
that the agencies must fund. 59
Congress provides funds for the self-determination contracts and their
support costs through the annual BIA and IHS lump-sum appropriations. 60
The ISDA provides that contract funding is “subject to the availability of
appropriations” and that “the Secretary is not required to reduce funding for
programs, projects, or activities serving a tribe to make funds available to
another tribe or tribal organization” when distributing ISDA funds. 61 These
funding stipulations are present in the ISDA’s model agreement
incorporated into every ISDA contract. 62
While the amount that Congress has appropriated for the ISDA program
has always been sufficient to satisfy the funding agreement for any
individual contractor, it has not always been sufficient to pay all tribes their
full, negotiated support costs. 63 Despite the shortfall, the Anti-Deficiency
Act prevents government officials from unauthorized government spending;
thus, the agencies have been forced to underpay tribes for their support
costs when Congress under-appropriates to the ISDA program. 64
57. See id. at 19.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
61. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b) (2012).
62. Id. §§ 450l(a), 450l(c) (setting forth the model contract and providing that it must be
incorporated into every ISDA contract). Under “Funding amount,” the Model Contract
provides, “Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary shall make available to
the Contractor the total amount specified in the annual funding agreement . . . .” Id. § 450l(c)
(section 1(b)(4) of the model agreement) (mirroring statutory funding language).
63. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2188 (2012) (noting the
shortfall leading to the tribe’s lawsuit); Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631,
635–36 (2005) (same); Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1056–57 (10th
Cir. 2011) (“Congress has mandated that all self-determination contracts provide full
funding of CSCs [contract support costs], see § 450j-1(g), but has nevertheless failed to
appropriate funds sufficient to pay all CSCs every year since 1994 . . . .”); see also COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1394–96.
64. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2193 (noting the Anti-Deficiency Act’s prohibition on
payments by officials for which Congress has not appropriated money from the treasury);
see also Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting government
employees from committing public funds without appropriation by Congress). In Cherokee,
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Attempting an equitable distribution, the BIA and IHS began paying tribes
on a pro-rata basis, leaving the tribal contractors with only a fraction of
their negotiated funds after incurring the full cost of performing their ISDA
contracts. 65
The negative effects of the shortfalls for successive fiscal years
underscore the importance of the CSCs to tribes’ self-determination efforts
under the ISDA. 66 In a 1999 General Accounting Office Report (“1999
GAO Report”), the GAO, now Government Accountability Office,
interviewed the officials of over ninety tribes about the shortfall problem. 67
The 1999 GAO Report found, “The effects varied, depending on the
number and the type of methods the tribes employed to deal with these
funding shortfalls.” 68 Furthermore,
To compensate for them, nearly all the tribes have reduced their
indirect costs to manage programs within the funds provided,
thereby lessening administrative productivity and efficiency.
Furthermore, many tribes have had to cover the shortfalls with
tribal resources, if available, thereby foregoing the opportunity
to use those resources to promote the tribes’ economic
development. Many tribes had to use direct program funds to
cover the shortfalls, thereby reducing direct program services. In
addition, a few tribes said they have refused or postponed the
opportunity to contract programs, thereby stalling their progress
toward self-determination. 69
Indeed, the effects appear to mirror the deficiencies in the former,
inadequate federal policy toward Indian tribes that Congress described as a
the IHS claimed that it could not pay contract support costs in full because it had allocated
its discretionary spending to other programs, such as running its Washington D.C. office,
and therefore could not afford to pay full contract support costs to the tribes. See Cherokee,
543 U.S. at 641–42. In Ramah, the government argued that the BIA Secretary could not pay
out full contract support cost funding because of the existence of a statutory cap—a figure
Congress set as part of the BIA’s discretionary appropriations. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at
2191.
65. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2187 (“Between FY 1994 and 2001, appropriations
covered only between 77% and 92% of tribes’ aggregate contract support costs.”).
66. See Rolnick, supra note 23 (“[F]ederal Indian programs remain devastatingly underfunded, and this under-funding is passed through to tribes via the ISDA. This is precisely
why contract support costs matter so much to tribes.”).
67. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 38.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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reason to initiate the ISDA scheme. 70 Yet, Congress has simply
acknowledged the shortfalls as a consequence of tighter budgets, 71 making
little to no effort to pay the government’s debts to the tribal contractors. In
response, the tribes have had to sue for damages on breach of contract to
pay full support costs. 72
B. Congressional Appropriations and ISDA Funding
The U.S. Constitution provides, “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .” 73
Thus, Congress finances ISDA contracts by appropriating funds to the BIA
and the IHS. Congress can pass legislation that authorizes the withdrawal of
funds according to set criteria, or, as is more common, it can pass an
appropriations act that lasts for one or more fiscal years. 74 A House of
Representatives committee or subcommittee usually starts an appropriations
bill, which the Senate then amends before both houses pass the bill and
send it to the President. Appropriations acts come in four kinds: (1) regular,

70. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
71. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 28. “[T]he Conference Report
accompanying the first capped appropriation for the BIA in FY 1994 explained that it was
necessary to impose a limit because ‘significant increases in contract support will make
future increases in tribal programs difficult to achieve.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-299,
at 28 (1993) (Conf. Rep.)). “Likewise, legislators explained their decision to continue
limiting the appropriations available to the Indian Health Service for contract support costs
in FY 2000 on the ground that Congress ‘cannot afford to appropriate 100% of contract
support costs at the expense of basic program funding for tribes.’” Id. (quoting Arctic Slope
Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296, 1306 (2010) (quoting in turn H.R. REP. NO. 106222, at 112 (1999))).
72. See, e.g., Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2188 (2012)
(recounting that the respondent tribes sued for breach of contract); Cherokee Nation v.
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 635–36 (2005) (deciding two cases in which the tribes submitted
claims for payment on the ISDA contracts); Arctic Slope, 629 F.3d at 1298, vacated, 132 S.
Ct. 2181 (2012) (noting that Arctic Slope was, at the time, “the latest in a long-running
dispute between the various Indian tribes and the Secretary concerning the Secretary’s
obligation to pay contract support costs”). The ISDA provides that the contractor may sue
the government for money damages under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–613
(2012), if the government fails to pay out on a valid ISDA contract. 25 U.S.C. § 450m-1(d)
(2012); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1394–96.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
74. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET : POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 215 (3d ed.
2007) (“In contrast to authorizing legislation, which is presumed to be permanent, an
appropriations act and any substantive provisions in it expire at the end of the fiscal year—
unless the text makes them permanent or effective beyond the fiscal year.”).
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lasting a single fiscal year; 75 (2) supplemental, made to commit “additional
budget resources when the regular appropriation is deemed insufficient”; 76
(3) continuing, which “fund agencies that have not received regular
appropriations by the start of the fiscal year”; 77 and (4) permanent, which
are “usually enacted in substantive legislation [and] become available
without current action by Congress.” 78 For the ISDA, Congress
appropriates funds for the BIA and the IHS each fiscal year with a regular
appropriation, 79 although in some years it makes appropriations in a
continuing resolution. 80
Congress can place certain restrictions within an appropriations act on
how a given agency might use its discretionary funds. 81 Thus, for example,
in 1994 Congress made funds available for the ISDA contracts,
“[p]rovided . . . [t]hat not to exceed $91,223,000 of the funds in this Act
shall be available for payments to tribes and tribal organizations for
indirect costs associated with contracts or grants or compacts authorized by
the [ISDA] for fiscal year 1994 and previous years . . . .”82 That was the
first year that Congress placed such a restriction on indirect-cost spending
for the BIA appropriation. 83 The Conference Report accompanying that act
75. Id. (noting that regular appropriations establish “budget authority for the upcoming
fiscal year . . . or for the year in progress.”).
76. Id.
77. Id. (noting that continuing appropriations are usually called continuing resolutions
because they are passed by joint resolution between the House and the Senate).
78. Id.
79. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2187 (2012) (“During Fiscal
Years (FYs) 1994 to 2001, respondent Tribes contracted with the Secretary of the Interior to
provide services . . . . During each FY, Congress appropriated a total amount to the [BIA]
‘for the operation of Indian programs.’” (citation omitted)).
80. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, 1267 Stat.
1313 (2012) (continuing appropriations made in “The Department of the Interior,
Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2012 (division E of Public Law
112-74).”); see also SCHICK, supra note 74, at 215 (defining continuing appropriations as
bills that “fund agencies that have not received regular appropriations by the start of the
fiscal year”).
81. SCHICK, supra note 74, at 263 (“Sometimes the appropriations act itself specifies
that a portion of the money in the account be used for designated purposes. The
appropriation might specify that ‘not less than’ a certain amount should be spent on a
particular activity. When this or similar language appears in an appropriations act, the
spending agency usually ‘fences off’ the money by treating it as a subaccount.”).
82. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-138, 107 Stat. 1379 (1993) (emphasis added).
83. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 2011) (“In 1994,
Congress began capping CSC funding.”).
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stated that the restriction grew out of a concern for rising CSCs and
cautioned that “it is unlikely that large increases for this activity will be
available in future years’ budgets. . . . [S]ignificant increases in contract
support will make future increases in tribal programs difficult to achieve.” 84
For fiscal year 1995, a Senate Report noted another shortfall in the CSC
budget but “advised that the ‘shortfalls should be treated as onetime
occurrences and should not have any impact on determining future indirect
cost rates.’” 85 Nevertheless, Congress continued the “not to exceed”
restriction on the BIA appropriation for every subsequent fiscal year,
eventually changing the language to include all “contract support costs.” 86
C. Cherokee and Ramah: Built on Ordinary Government Contracting
Principles
Tribal contractors have twice reached the Supreme Court arguing to
receive unpaid CSCs, and they have succeeded on both occasions. In the
first case, Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, decided in 2005, the government
relied upon the “subject to the availability of appropriations” language to
argue that it was not liable for unpaid CSCs that went beyond Congress’s
unrestricted lump-sum appropriation. 87 Unlike the appropriation for the
BIA, the funds for the IHS did not contain a “not to exceed” CSC amount in
its lump-sum appropriation. 88 Thus, the IHS was not limited in its
discretionary budget to pay for tribes’ CSCs.
Since the IHS could allocate funds at its discretion, the agency
prioritized some expenditures over CSC payments, and once the
appropriations ran out, they were no longer “available” to the tribes, or so
the government argued. 89 The Court disagreed with the government and
reasoned that “subject to the availability of appropriations” did not mean
that the tribal contractors were entitled only to what the agency, in its
84. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-299, at 28 (1993) (Conf. Rep.)).
85. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-294, at 57 (1994)).
86. Id. (“[F]unding shortfalls for CSCs were repeated every fiscal year from 1994 to
2001. Later appropriations acts, usually passed at the beginning of the fiscal year, used the
phrase ‘contract support costs’ rather than ‘indirect costs,’ but each included the same ‘not to
exceed’ language.” (citations omitted)).
87. See Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 636 (2005) (“[The government’s]
sole defense consists of the argument that it is legally bound by its promises if, and only if,
Congress appropriated sufficient funds, and that, in this instance, Congress failed to do so.”).
88. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-138, 107 Stat. 1379 (1993).
89. Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 643–44 (rejecting the government’s reliance on the “subject
to the availability of appropriations” clause).
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discretion, decided to allocate to the tribes. 90 Rather, the clause had an
“ordinary” meaning as an often-used government contracts phrase
indicating that “an agency and a contracting party can negotiate a contract
prior to the beginning of a fiscal year but that the contract will not become
binding unless and until Congress appropriates funds for that year.” 91
“Subject to the availability of appropriations,” then, means only that a
government contract will not become binding unless and until Congress
appropriates funds for the contract. The validity of the contract hinges on
whether Congress allocates sufficient funds to the agency, in effect
approving the contracting officer’s negotiation.
Rejecting the government’s arguments for treating the ISDA contracts as
“special,” 92—i.e. giving the clause more weight than for normal
government contracts—the Court instead treated the contracts as ordinary
government contracts and held that
as long as Congress has appropriated sufficient legally
unrestricted funds to pay the contracts at issue, the Government
normally cannot back out of a promise to pay on grounds of
“insufficient appropriations,” even if the contract uses language
such as “subject to the availability of appropriations,” and even
if an agency’s total lump-sum appropriation is insufficient to pay
all the contracts the agency has made. 93
The Court noted that the ISDA “uses the word ‘contract’ 426 times to
describe the nature of the Government’s promise . . . .” 94 Thus, the Court
treated the ISDA agreements as regular contracts, making the government
liable for what it had promised. 95 The “subject to the availability” clause
had no effect on liability, if, from the individual contractor’s point of view,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 643, 644 (noting that the government had the burden to show why the Court
“should not give this kind of statutory language its ordinary contract-related interpretation, at
least in the absence of a showing that Congress meant the contrary”).
92. Id. at 638–39, 643–44 (rejecting the government’s argument based on a special
“‘government-to-government’” relationship between the federal government and the tribes,
that the ISDA contracts put the tribes in the shoes of a federal agency and must deal with
Congress’s restrictions in appropriations as an agency must, and that a “special, rather than
ordinary, interpretation” should be given to the contractual language).
93. Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 639 (defining “contract” according to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 1 (1979)).
95. See id. (rejecting the government’s argument that the ISDA means the contracts
should be treated specially).
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sufficient funds were available (as part of the lump-sum appropriation) to
satisfy its CSC needs. 96
The Cherokee Court based its decision on a long-standing government
contracting principle known as the Ferris doctrine, based on an 1893 Court
of Claims case, Ferris v. United States. 97 That case involved a contract
between the federal government and a private company for drainage work
on the Delaware River. 98 The dredgers began performance under the
contract and substantially completed much of the work; however, they
stopped mid-way because the funds appropriated for the contract ran out
(they were distributed to other contractors). 99 The court held that the
dredgers were entitled to the full amount due under the contract when the
government appropriated enough to satisfy the dredger’s contract, though it
could not satisfy all of the contracts made under the appropriation 100:
A contractor who is one of several persons to be paid out of an
appropriation is not chargeable with knowledge of its
administration, nor can his legal rights be affected or impaired
by its maladministration or by its diversion, whether legal or
illegal, to other objects. An appropriation per se merely imposes
limitations upon the Government’s own agents; it is a definite
amount of money intrusted [sic] to them for distribution; but its
insufficiency does not pay the Government’s debts, nor cancel
its obligations, nor defeat the rights of other parties. 101
96. Id. at 639–40.
97. See id. at 637–38 (drawing on government contracting principles with regard to
appropriations, specifically from Ferris v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 (1893)).
98. See Ferris, 27 Ct. Cl. at 542–43 (describing the nature of the government contract at
issue).
99. See id. at 543–44 (describing how the contractors were delayed in their efforts but
claimed lost profits when appropriations ran out).
100. See id. at 547 (concluding that the contractor was entitled to lost profits that it would
have received from full contract funding).
101. Id. at 546 (citing Dougherty v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 496, 503 (1883)).
Dougherty, also cited in Cherokee and Ramah, says the following about liability under
government contracts:
Next it is said that the contract was void because the annual appropriation had,
at the time of the purchase been covered by other contracts. We held in
Shipman’s case, this term . . . that when one contract on its face assumes to
provide for the execution of all the work authorized by an appropriation, the
contractor is bound to know the amount of the appropriation, and cannot
recover beyond it; but we have never held that persons contracting with the
Government for partial service under general appropriations are bound to know
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Thus, the Ferris decision means that the government cannot avoid liability
under a contract by distributing funds under a lump-sum appropriation in
such a way that the funds are exhausted as to a specific contractor who
would otherwise fall within the lump-sum appropriation. 102
Applying Ferris, the Court’s decision in Cherokee was a win for Indian
tribes seeking full payment of their CSCs under the ISDA; where Congress
had provided sufficient unrestricted appropriations, no cap limited the
agency’s spending on CSCs. 103
However, the federal government continued to avoid paying in full when
Congress restricted the appropriations that agencies could use for CSCs
through a “not to exceed” limitation on the agencies’ discretionary
spending. 104 The circuit courts split on this post-Cherokee litigation, with
the Federal Circuit finding against the tribes in Arctic Slope and the Tenth
Circuit for the tribes in Ramah. 105 The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve
the split in 2012 and found in favor of the tribes, affirming the Tenth
Circuit’s decision—a boon to tribal interests before the Supreme Court and
an important holding in its own right with respect to other government

the condition of the appropriation account at the Treasury or on the contract
book of the Department. To do so might block the wheels of the Government.
The statutory restraints in this respect apply to the official, but they do not
affect the rights in this court of the citizen honestly contracting with the
Government.
Dougherty, 18 Ct. Cl. at 503; see also Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 643 (citing Dougherty, 18 Ct.
Cl. at 503); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2189 (2012) (citing
Dougherty, 18 Ct. Cl. at 503)).
102. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2189 (summing up the rule from Cherokee, which relied
on Ferris and Dougherty) (“When a Government contractor is one of several persons to be
paid out of a larger appropriation sufficient in itself to pay the contractor, it has long been
the rule that the Government is responsible to the contractor for the full amount due under
the contract, even if the agency exhausts the appropriation in service of other permissible
ends.”).
103. Id. (describing the Court’s holding in Cherokee).
104. See id. at 2187 (noting the statutory cap Congress placed on the amount of
appropriations that could be used for ISDA contract support costs); COHEN’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 6, at 1395 (observing that “Cherokee Nation did not involve an appropriations act
specifically capping payment of contract support costs. Again faced with a shortfall in funds,
the Secretary began paying all contract support costs on a pro rata basis.”); Rolnick, supra
note 23 (noting that the only difference between Ramah and Cherokee was “[t]he existence
of the statutory cap”); supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
105. See Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296, 1306 (2010) (deciding
against the tribes). But see Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1077 (2011),
aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012) (deciding for the tribes).
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contractors. 106 In Ramah, the Court stated that the principles underlying
Cherokee “dictate[d] the result” in that case because the statutory cap on
CSC spending still exceeded the amount necessary to satisfy any one ISDA
contractor. 107 As in Cherokee, the Court in Ramah relied heavily on the
contractual nature of the obligation and rejected Congress’s attempt to limit
liability by restricting the agencies’ ability to provide CSCs.108
The Government attempted to distinguish Ramah from Cherokee by
invoking the statutory cap Congress placed on the amount of ISDA funds
for CSCs. 109 The Court rejected the attempt as a distinction without a
difference, finding that in both cases, “the agency remained free to allocate
funds among multiple contractors, so long as the contracts served the
purpose Congress identified.” 110 The “not to exceed” language instead
meant only that the agency could not use funds other than those specified to
supplement the support cost appropriation in case of a shortfall. 111 As in
other government contracts, the under-appropriation affected only the
agency’s action in distributing the funds; it did not affect the government’s
liability for breaching the contracts. 112 Thus, the Court rested its decision
squarely on the Ferris doctrine reiterated in Cherokee when interpreting the
statutory language incorporated in the ISDA contracts. 113
106. Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2195 (affirming the Tenth Circuit and vacating the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Arctic Slope).
107. Id. at 2190 (“The principles underlying Cherokee Nation and Ferris dictate the
result in this case. Once ‘Congress has appropriated sufficient legally unrestricted funds to
pay the contracts at issue, the Government normally cannot back out of a promise to pay on
grounds of “insufficient appropriations,” even if the contract uses language such as “subject
to the availability of appropriations,” and even if an agency’s total lump-sum appropriation
is insufficient to pay all the contracts the agency has made.’” (quoting Cherokee Nation v.
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 637 (2005))).
108. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2188, 2191 (reiterating Cherokee’s insistence on treating
the ISDA agreements as ordinary contracts and adopting that position with regard to the
Ramah contracts).
109. See id. at 2191 (describing Ramah and Cherokee’s differences from Ferris).
110. Id. at 2192 (holding that the differences between Ramah, Cherokee, and Ferris were
insignificant under the circumstances).
111. See id. (noting that the “not to exceed” language did have legal effect by “protecting
funds that Congress envisioned for other BIA programs, including tribes that choose not to
enter ISDA contracts”).
112. See id. at 2191 (standing for the proposition that contractors are “‘not chargeable
with knowledge’ of [an agency’s distribution choices], ‘nor [could their] legal rights be
affected or impaired by its maladministration or by its diversion.’” (quoting Ferris v. United
States, 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 (1893))).
113. See id. at 2190–91 (“The principles underlying Cherokee Nation and Ferris dictate
the result in this case.”).
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Construing the contracts for the benefit of the tribes, 114 the Court
affirmed that the government is legally obligated to fund tribal CSCs. In
doing so, however, it left resolution of the problem in the hands of
Congress. 115 Since the tribes sued for money damages under the Contract
Disputes Act, as directed by the ISDA, they could recover from the
Judgment Fund for any damages caused by the government’s breach by
nonpayment. 116
Nevertheless, the tribe’s legal action remains the only remedy available,
precipitating a lawsuit to force the government’s hand when Congress
under-appropriates. 117 The Court noted several possible solutions that
Congress might adopt to avoid further liability. 118 Part III analyzes these
solutions and others suggested by the 1999 GAO Report with a critical eye
toward the policy articulated by the ISDA as well as federal budget
concerns for efficiency, ultimately determining that these solutions fail to
meet the self-determination goals of the ISDA. Part IV argues that Congress
should reject the responses that would weaken the ISDA. Instead, Congress
should embrace robust reforms in the funding and cost structure of ISDA
contracts. These reforms would incentivize efficiency while ensuring full
funding, thereby fulfilling the obligation set forth in the ISDA to increase
the responsiveness of public services to tribal needs and enhance the
progress of American Indian tribes through self-determination.
III. Discussion and Critique of Currently Proposed Congressional
Responses to the Shortfall Problem
Having established the background to Ramah and its underlying theories
in the preceding Part, this section will explore the options open to Congress
114. Id. at 2191 (“[E]ach provision of the [ISDA] and each provision of this [Model]
Contract shall be liberally construed for the benefit of the Contractor.” (quoting 25 U.S.C. §
240l(c) (2012))).
115. See id. at 2195 (“On the one hand, Congress obligated the Secretary to accept every
qualifying ISDA contract, which includes a promise of ‘full’ funding for all contract support
costs. On the other, Congress appropriated insufficient funds to pay in full each tribal
contractor. The Government’s frustration is understandable, but the dilemma’s resolution is
the responsibility of Congress.”).
116. See id. at 2193–94.
117. But see infra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (noting that the government,
knowing it faces liability, will avoid the lawsuit by supplementing the appropriation to cover
the shortfall).
118. Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2195 (suggesting various options available to Congress, and
noting that “[t]he desirability of these options is not for us to say. We make clear only that
Congress has ample means at hand to resolve the situation underlying the Tribes’ suit.”).
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to stop the liability leak caused by chronic shortfalls in appropriations.
Whether Congress has intentionally or inadvertently underfunded tribes’
CSCs—and there is evidence to suggest that it has done so intentionally,
albeit ostensibly begrudgingly 119—the government is now unquestionably
faced with a breach of contract when Congress appropriates insufficient
funds for tribes’ CSCs. 120 Given the possibility of liability iterated in
Ramah, Congress now has an incentive to retract its full-funding promise
and force tribes to cut costs, rather than cede control to the federal agencies
and the tribes and simply appropriate full funds. This Part will demonstrate
that solutions in line with this incentive to retract the full-funding promise
either fail to respect the ISDA’s self-determination goals or continue to
subject the federal government to liability after Ramah.
In evaluating these potential solutions, several criteria should be
considered. First, Congress must be able to either limit the government’s
liability or ensure that shortfalls do not occur that could subject the

119. See supra note 71. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 26.
For more than a decade, the BIA published a notice in the Federal Register
each year describing the shortfalls in funding for contract support costs and the
methodology the agency would use to allocate the available money. As the
dissent below explained, the ‘very purpose’ of these notices was to ‘warn[]
tribal organizations of the possibility of insufficient funding.’ In 2006, in
consultation with tribes, the agency adopted an explicit nationwide policy for
the equitable distribution of funding for contract support costs in light of the
recurring shortfalls. And each year the BIA has developed its budget requests—
including any requests for additional contract support cost funding—in
consultation with the tribes. The inadequacy of available appropriations, in
short, has been “no secret.”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(i) (2012)).
120. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2195 (“For the period in question [that is, until Congress
resolves the shortfall dilemma], it is the Government—not the Tribes—that must bear the
consequences of Congress’ decision to mandate that the Government enter into binding
contracts for which its appropriation was sufficient to pay any individual tribal contractor,
but ‘insufficient to pay all the contracts the agency has made.’” (quoting Cherokee Nation v.
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 637 (2005))); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 16
(referring to the Tenth Circuit’s declaration below “that the government is liable for the
contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, notwithstanding the
appropriations caps, because ‘Congress passed the ISDA, guaranteeing funding for
necessary [contract support costs], and its appropriations resulted in an on-going breach of
the ISDA’s promise.’” (citation omitted)); Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054,
1070 n.9 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[25 U.S.C.] § 450j-1(b) is necessarily violated whenever
Congress appropriates less than total contract support cost need.”).
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government to liability. 121 Second, Congress must be able to maintain some
measure of control over the amount of CSCs it funds—incentives must be
in place to encourage tribes to run their programs efficiently. 122 Third, the
solution should encourage tribes to enter into ISDA contracts. 123 Finally,
and corollary to the third, the solution must not undercut the ISDA’s
original self-determination purpose by discouraging tribes from entering
into ISDA contracts or so under-funding the program that tribes would be
better off without such contracts. 124
With these criteria in mind, this Part analyzes each potential solution in
turn, from varying appropriations methods and amendments to the statutory
funding structure, to negotiated changes in the nature of ISDA contracts.
Solutions have been suggested by the Tenth Circuit, 125 the Supreme Court
in Ramah, 126 and the 1999 GAO Report seeking to address the CSC
shortfall problem. 127 The following subparts introduce and analyze these
suggested solutions that could eliminate liability or shortfalls but fail one or
more of the criteria set forth above.
A. Attempt Full Funding in the Existing Structure
The first possible solution is to take no action. 128 Congress would remain
liable for shortfalls, but maintaining the status quo allows Congress to
121. Liability for under-funding the ISDA will be an ongoing problem as the government
will receive requests for supplementary appropriations and, if those requests are denied, will
be required to pay the tribes’ contract claims out of the Judgment Fund eventually. See infra
notes 127–28 and accompanying text. Moreover, if no changes are made, the contracting
tribes will be in the same position as before Ramah, incurring injuries for lack of funding for
their programs. See supra Part II.A.
122. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting that Congress placed the “not to
exceed” restriction in its ISDA appropriations out of concern for rising CSCs); infra note
151 and accompanying text (noting that Congress has underfunded the ISDA program
because of its concern for rising costs and because it wants to maintain control over the
program’s funds); see also infra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that ISDA contract
costs will likely continue to rise).
123. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text (describing the popularity of the
ISDA programs and the benefits the contracts have conferred to participating tribes).
124. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (describing the negative effects of the
shortfall problem, including the response of some tribes to forego the opportunity to contract
for program control).
125. See infra Part III.B.
126. See supra note 118.
127. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34.
128. Bernard J. Pazanowski, Tribes Get All Support Costs Under Contract Despite
Congressional Effort to Cap Payment, 80 U.S.L.W. 1756 (June 26, 2012), available at
http://news.bna.com/lwln/LWLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=27122891&vname=lw1notallis
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continue to control the funds that go to CSCs, as it has with the “not to
exceed” restriction on the BIA’s discretionary spending. 129 Tribes can then
threaten to sue the government under the Contract Disputes Act and recover
from the Judgment Fund. 130 Presumably, the government will avoid the
losing lawsuit, and the agency will request supplemental appropriations for
any shortfalls. 131 Shortfalls are not inevitable; however, there is evidence to
suggest that Congress is attempting to increase transparency—so that it can
come closer to appropriating the actual CSCs needed—without changing
the appropriation process or the nature of the contracts at all, meaning that

sues&jd=a0d3e6c6u7&split=0 (interviewing Herbert L. Fenster, “who filed an amicus brief in
[Ramah] supporting the tribes on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National
Defense Industrial Association,” saying “that he does not expect the opinion to alter the way
government agencies do business.” He said, “I think the government has so much invested in
making its contractors ‘volunteers' in financing some government work, that it will not respond
at all to this decision.”).
129. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 20–21 (arguing that “Congress
made clear in at least four places in the [ISDA] that it intended to exercise complete control
over the disbursement of funds from the Treasury for federal programs administered by
tribes under the ISDA, just as it would if the same programs were administered by the
Secretary directly.”).
130. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2193 (2012) (“Congress
expressly provided in ISDA that tribal contractors were entitled to sue for ‘money damages’
under the Contract Disputes Act upon the Government’s failure to pay, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450m1(a), (d), and judgments against the Government under that Act are payable from the
Judgment Fund, 41 U.S.C. § 7108(a).” (footnote omitted)); id. (“[T]he Government argues
that Congress could not have intended for respondents to recover from the Judgment Fund,
31 U.S.C. § 1304, because that would allow the Tribes to circumvent Congress’ intent to cap
total expenditures for contract support costs.” (footnote omitted)); see also Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 18 (“The Judgment Fund is not a back-up source of agency
appropriations. Nor is it an invitation to litigants to circumvent express restrictions imposed
by Congress on the expenditure of funds from the Treasury. As this Court explained in OPM
v. Richmond . . . ‘[t]he general appropriation for payment of judgments *** does not create
an all-purpose fund for judicial disbursement.’ The Judgment Fund exists solely to pay ‘final
judgments, awards, compromise settlements, and interest and costs’ when ‘payment is not
otherwise provided for.’” (internal citations omitted)).
131. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6-41 to -42 (“In simple
terms, once an appropriation is exhausted, the making of any further payments, apart from
using expired balances to liquidate or make adjustments to valid obligations recorded against
that appropriation, violates 31 U.S.C. § 1341. When the appropriation is fully expended, no
further payments may be made in any case. If an agency finds itself in this position, unless it
has transfer authority or other clear statutory basis for making further payments, it has little
choice but to seek a deficiency or supplemental appropriation from Congress, and to adjust
or curtail operations as may be necessary.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
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it keeps the “not to exceed” language within the lump-sum discretionary
spending appropriated to the agencies. 132
Congress can conceivably attempt full funding within the current system
as is, avoiding shortfalls, but under the current system, the government has
little control over the rising costs associated with contract support. 133
Although full funding would encourage tribes to enter into more selfdetermination contracts, they may have no incentive to increase
efficiency. 134 Rather, they could attempt to maximize their “indirect”
costs 135 because the law, after Ramah, assures them full funding.
Eliminating that risk, however, is a problem for every solution that
maintains full funding under the indirect-cost-rate system. 136
B. Appropriate on a Contract-by-Contract Basis with a Line-Item
Appropriation
The Tenth Circuit suggested that Congress could shift from a lump-sum
appropriation method to line-item appropriations for CSCs on a contractby-contract basis. 137 By making the appropriations contract-by-contract, the
132. See H.R. 6091, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposed appropriations bill for the Department
of the Interior and other related agencies, “[f]or expenses necessary for the operation of
Indian programs . . . [including the ISDA], $2,404,672,000, to remain available until
September 30, 2014 . . . of which, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but
not limited to the [ISDA], not to exceed $228,000,000 shall be available for payments for
contract support costs . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-589, at 81 (2012) (noting with regard to the
IHS: “The Committee recommends $546,446,000 for Contract Support Costs, $75,009,000
above the fiscal year 2012 enacted level and $70,000,000 above the budget request. With
this increase, the Committee is attempting to fund the projected shortfall so the Federal
government can meet its contractual obligations. The Committee directs the Service to work
with Tribes and tribal organizations to explore options for improving the transparency of
current year contract support cost information, and to report back to the Committee within
90 days of enactment of this Act” and using similar language regarding the BIA); Ramah,
132 S. Ct. at 2195 (“Any one of the options . . . could also promote transparency about the
Government’s fiscal obligations with respect to ISDA’s directive that contract support costs
be paid in full.”).
133. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 25 (finding that “barring any major
changes (e.g., in the circumstances of the tribes or in the law), contract support costs will
likely continue to increase in the future.”).
134. See id. at 56.
135. See id.
136. See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text (describing the indirect-cost-rate
system). See generally 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34.
137. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 29 (interpreting the Tenth Circuit
as suggesting that “if Congress wished to cap federal spending on contract support costs
without amending the substantive provisions of the Act, it was required to ‘limit
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tribal contractors would be on notice, having been made knowledgeable of
the contracting officer’s administration, and would thus not be able to
recover from a shortfall in appropriations under the Ferris doctrine. 138
Rather, the “subject to the availability of appropriations” language would
apply, and the contractor would know, as soon as the appropriation became
known to him, that he was contractually entitled only to the amount actually
appropriated—his contract is literally subject to the availability of the
appropriated amount, which has been limited specifically by Congress in
his case. 139
An advantage to such a scheme would be to eliminate shortfall
liability—as Congress needs to do—while maintaining a restriction on the
amount of funds agencies can provide for CSCs—as Congress wants to do.
However, the practicalities of Congress ratifying hundreds of contracts may
prove such a scheme untenable. 140 Congress provides a lump-sum
appropriation to the agencies precisely because it does not want to deal with
each contract; it delegates the contract-making authority and the business of
negotiating contracts to the agencies for classic administrative law
reasons. 141 A line-item appropriation would require Congress to hammer
appropriations on a contract-by-contract basis’ for hundreds of tribal organizations
nationwide.” (citation omitted)); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2195
(2012) (“Congress could elect to make line-item appropriations, allocating funds to cover
tribes’ contract support costs on a contractor-by-contractor basis.”).
138. See Ferris v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 (1892) (“‘A contractor who is one of
several persons to be paid out of an appropriation is not chargeable with knowledge of its
administration . . . .”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6-44
(“Where a contractor is but one party out of several to be paid from a general appropriation,
the contractor is under no obligation to know the status or condition of the appropriation
account on the government’s books. If the appropriation becomes exhausted, the
Antideficiency Act may prevent the agency from making any further payments, but valid
obligations will remain enforceable in the courts.”).
139. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6-45 (“However, under a
specific line-item appropriation, the answer is different. The contractor in this situation is
deemed to have notice of the limits on the spending power of the government official with
whom he contracts. A contract under these circumstances is valid only up to the amount of
the available appropriation. Exhaustion of the appropriation will generally bar any further
recovery beyond that limit.” (citations omitted)).
140. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 22 (“As of December 1998, there were
556 federally recognized tribes. Agency officials estimate that nearly all of the federally
recognized tribes administer at least one BIA or IHS contract either directly or as a member
of a tribal consortium. Tribes may administer multiple contracts from BIA and IHS.”).
141. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 614
(1927) (stating that administrative agencies, “subsidiary law-making bodies” to Congress
and State legislatures, generally “‘fill[] in the details’ of a policy set forth in statutes. . . . The
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out in an appropriations subcommittee each individual contract and provide
a line item in the appropriations bill for each contract, all subject to
congressional debate. 142
The line-item approach runs into more problems, however, when
considered in light of the self-determination theory underlying the ISDA
and the effect a line-item appropriation might have on tribes’ willingness to
contract. Tribes may shy away from the ISDA program if their only
guarantee is whatever the appropriations committee, rather than the BIA or
IHS, with whom they have a direct relationship, decides to give them.
Moreover, the tribes’ management of their programs would be contingent
on federal determinations of sufficient funding, limiting tribal choices in
allocating the best use of the resources they do receive. In subjecting tribes
to the dictates of the federal government, such a course runs contrary to the
principles and purposes underlying the ISDA. 143
C. Amend the ISDA to Eliminate the Mandate to Accept Every Qualifying
Contract
Instead of changing its appropriation method, Congress could remove the
ISDA provision that requires the BIA and IHS secretaries to accept every
qualifying contract. 144 Agencies could still enter into self-determination
contracts, but the law would allow them more discretion in accepting
contracts, thereby controlling costs according to budget and avoiding any
shortfalls in payment. In addition, Congress could maintain its restriction on
CSC funding. 145

control of banking, insurance, public utilities, finance, industry, the professions, health and
morals, in sum, the manifold response of government to the forces and needs of modern
society, is building up a body of laws not written by legislatures . . . .”); Jody Freeman &
Martha Minow, Introduction to GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT : OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 7–9, 15, 20 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (“[T]oward the end of
the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first, federal and state governments have
relied heavily on ongoing contracts with private providers for a much broader range of
government functions, making contract the primary mechanism of government action, and
arguably government’s most important means of control over the provision of public
services.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See supra Part II.B.
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2195 (2012) (suggesting to
Congress the option, among others, of “amending the ISDA to remove the statutory mandate
compelling the BIA to enter into self-determination contracts”); 25 U.S.C. § 450f (2012)
(directing the Secretary to enter into an ISDA contract upon the request of any Indian tribe).
145. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
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However, a disadvantage to such an approach is the fact that the statutory
mandate to enter into self-determination contracts is one of several essential
components of the ISDA program’s success. The ISDA guarantees tribes
the funding for direct programs and CSCs if they submit a qualifying
contract. 146 They do not have to bid for federal favor through a solicitation.
Rather, their relationship flows from the government’s trust responsibility,
and entitlement to CSCs accrues whenever a tribal contractor qualifies
under the ISDA rules. 147 This relationship makes sense in the ISDA
structure because tribes are not and should not be competing for federal
funding. 148 The ISDA is open to any and every tribe in keeping with the

146. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2195 (“Congress obligated the Secretary to accept every
qualifying ISDA contract, which includes a promise of ‘full’ funding for all contract support
costs.”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 1387 (stating that an agency “may only deny
a tribal request to enter into a self-determination contract if the service to the Indian
beneficiaries will not be satisfactory, the contract will jeopardize the trust resources of the
tribe, the tribe cannot fulfill the contract, the proposed cost is more than that permitted under
the Act, or the activity is outside the scope of the Act ‘because the proposal includes
activities that cannot lawfully be carried out by the contractor.’”).
147. See Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1075 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s
a Ramah plaintiff representative explained by affidavit, her tribe ‘always understood that the
contract amount represents an entitlement under the Self-Determination Act, even if
payment is delayed until Congress makes the necessary appropriation.’”); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 19 (“The court of appeals suggested at points . . . that tribes'
purported entitlement to ‘full funding’ of contract support costs irrespective of the
appropriations caps springs from the ISDA itself, and at other points that such an entitlement
flows from principles of contract law.” (citation omitted)); id. at 22 (“The Tenth Circuit has
since reaffirmed this erroneous interpretation of the ISDA, holding that an Indian tribe is
‘entitled to a contract specifying the full statutory amount’ of contract support costs, and that
the government is forbidden even from negotiating for the tribe's agreement to accept a
lower sum in light of the lack of available appropriations. . . . The court of appeals declared
in Southern Ute that ‘[a] tribe cannot be forced to enter into a self-determination contract
waiving its entitlement to full [contract support cost] funding.’” (citation omitted) (quoting
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1071, 1083 (2011))); see also supra Part
II.A.
148. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2186 (“Congress enacted ISDA in 1975 in order to achieve
‘maximum Indian participation in the direction of educational as well as other Federal
services to Indian communities so as to render such services more responsive to the needs
and desires of those communities.’ 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a).”); 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note
34, at 5 (“In passing the [ISDA], the Congress recognized that the government’s
administration of Indian programs prevented tribes from establishing their own policies and
making their own decisions about program services. The act removes that impediment . . .
.”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he prolonged Federal domination of Indian
service programs has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and
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self-determination goal. Indeed, the statutory scheme exchanges the
programs that the federal government would provide for ones that the tribes
can provide themselves, albeit with federal funding. Removing the statutory
mandate cuts at least some qualifying tribes out of the ISDA program and
forces them to accept federally administered programs—exactly the
practice the ISDA sought to end. 149
A related response is to pass a moratorium on new self-determination
contracts. 150 This was the temporary solution Congress tried in 1998 to
contain the CSC shortfalls, but it did not result in any ultimate solutions that
would keep the ISDA program alive and working for tribes. 151
D. Amend the ISDA to Eliminate the Requirement of Full Funding for
Contract Support Costs
Another possibility is that Congress could simply eliminate the ISDA
requirement of fully funded CSCs. 152 Without a contractual or statutory
guarantee of CSC funding, tribes could not subject the government to
liability for a deficiency in appropriations. 153 Congress could limit its

their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity to develop leadership skills
crucial to the realization of self-government . . . .”).
149. See supra notes 22–38 and accompanying text.
150. Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2195 (“[Congress] could also pass a moratorium on the
formation of new self-determination contracts, as it has done before.”).
151. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 2 (“In 1998, a year of concern and
controversy over contract support costs culminated in a statutorily imposed 1-year
moratorium for fiscal year 1999 on all new contracting under the Indian Self-Determination
Act.”).
152. See Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2195 (noting that Congress “could reduce the
Government’s financial obligation by . . . giving the BIA the flexibility to pay less than the
full amount of contract support costs.”); 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 57 (suggesting
to Congress the possibility that it could “amend the act to eliminate the provision for fully
funding allowable contract support costs, and, instead, provide funding strictly on the basis
of annual appropriations.”).
153. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 57 (“[T]his alternative would allow the
Congress to fund contract support costs at whatever level it deems appropriate. . . .[and]
would eliminate the expectation . . . that full contract support funding will be available,
when, in fact, appropriations and funding have been limited and have caused shortfalls.”).
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liability 154 and force tribal contractors to accept whatever agency funds are
available. 155
Such a course, however, would contravene the ISDA’s purpose,
guarantees, and provision for CSCs. Indian tribes have already become
more reluctant to enter into new self-determination contracts for lack of full
CSC funding. 156 Eliminating the guarantee of CSCs benefits the federal
budget balance, but it means that the tribes continue to suffer with less than
the needed funds. 157 Under the self-determination policy of the ISDA,
Congress needs to provide full funding for the tribes so that they get the full
benefit of the direct programs and their ability to administer them. 158

154. See Alan I. Saltman, The Ferris Doctrine: Reaffirmed, Nash & Cibinic Rep. (CCH),
Sept. 2012, ¶ 46 (vol. 26, no. 9) (noting that if Congress amended the ISDA to give agencies
“the flexibility to pay less than the full amount of contract support costs” it would “likely
requir[e] the inclusion of a specific notice/limitation of liability clause in the ISDA
contract”).
155. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 57 (“This alternative has the advantage of
limiting the growth of contract support funding . . . .”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 7, at 28.
The appropriations caps imposed in [Ramah] reflect a judgment by Congress
that, although the federal policies that are served by funding contract support
costs under the ISDA are important, those policies do not warrant the unlimited
disbursement of public money at the expense of other priorities, including other
programs benefitting Indians and Indian tribes. Thus, the Conference Report
accompanying the first capped appropriation for the BIA in FY 1994 explained
that it was necessary to impose a limit because “significant increases in contract
support will make future increases in tribal programs difficult to achieve.”
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-299, at 28 (1993) (Conf. Rep.)).
“Likewise, legislators explained their decision to continue limiting the appropriations
available to the Indian Health Service for contract support costs in FY 2000 on the ground
that Congress ‘cannot afford to appropriate 100% of contract support costs at the expense of
basic program funding for tribes.’” Id. (quoting Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 629
F.3d 1296, 1306 (2010) (quoting in turn H.R. REP. NO. 106-222, at 112 (1999))).
156. See supra Part II.A; 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 38–45 (detailing how
contract support funding shortfalls have adversely affected ISDA contracting tribes).
157. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 57–58 (“A disadvantage of this alternative
is that it may discourage tribes from entering into new self-determination contracts. . . . [I]f
they are not able to achieve full funding of their contract support costs, and particularly their
indirect costs, they may not continue to contract for federal programs or they may reduce the
number of programs they contract.”).
158. See supra Part II.A.
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E. Amend the ISDA to Limit Indirect Cost Rates
Congress could also amend the ISDA to impose limits on the indirect
cost rates that agencies use to calculate the majority of CSCs. 159 By
lowering the rate, Congress could spend less on CSCs—as it has intended
to—while continuing to provide a certain amount of CSC funding. 160 This
more balanced option has the further advantage of inducing tribes to limit
their administrative and other indirect costs because they will be aware of a
lower rate and thus lower availability of funds for CSCs. 161
However, this option ignores differing tribal CSC requirements. 162 While
this method incentivizes tribes to run their programs efficiently, lowering
the rate could cause some tribes to be unable to afford to manage ISDA
contracts and also could discourage some tribes from the self-determination
benefits of the ISDA. 163 In addition, this option would not eliminate the
shortfall possibility because it would not change the congressional
mechanism for funding CSCs. 164 Without a method for preventing Congress
from under-appropriating, this option leaves Congress vulnerable to
incurring liability for a shortfall.
F. Consolidate Direct Program Funds and Contract Support Costs in ISDA
Contracts
Instead of tweaking the existing indirect-cost-rate system, the
government could replace that system by consolidating CSCs with direct
programs in one master contract price that covers both. 165 Such an approach
159. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 58 (“[Another] alternative would be to amend
the law to limit the amount of funding tribes could receive for contract support by limiting
the amount of indirect costs tribes can receive. For example, one way to limit funding would
be to establish one indirect cost rate—such as the current aggregate rate of 25 percent—as a
flat rate that would apply to all tribes. Another method would be to fund tribes’ indirect costs
according to their rate, up to a specific limit, or ceiling—such as 25 percent—above which a
tribe could recover no more costs.”).
160. See id. (noting that one advantage to limited indirect cost rates is “imposing
limitations on the growth of contract support funding”).
161. See id. at 58–59 (noting that another advantage is to “eliminat[e] the expectation
created by the law’s current language that full contract support funding will be available”
(footnote omitted)).
162. See id. at 59 (noting how this alternative “ignores the differences among the
individual tribes’ actual indirect costs” and describing these differences).
163. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
164. See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 58.
165. Id. at 61 (“[Another] alternative would be to amend the act to eliminate the current
funding mechanism, which provides contract support funding over and above the program
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would mean that tribes could negotiate an overall contract price with the
agencies, including administrative and indirect costs, and the agencies
could submit that price to Congress in the their annual budgets. 166 This
approach increases certainty because the government would no longer
guarantee tribes CSC funds that it did not bargain for, and Congress’s
appropriation would cover all CSCs that it promised to pay for, as long as it
covered all the contracts collectively. 167
Moreover, this consolidated approach is in line with the ISDA’s selfdetermination goals because it encourages tribes to determine how best to
administer their programs. 168 Tribes could increase administrative and
“indirect” costs only by decreasing the amount they spend on direct
programs. This is even more self-determinative than the existing cost
structure because agencies would not have control over how tribes
administered their programs—$X for direct programs, $Y for contract
support—but would provide $Z amount to be used at tribal discretion.
Transparency would be key to making the system work, but transparency
would be more likely in a simplified, consolidated contract negotiating
process with the focus shifted away from CSCs. 169

funding, and replace it with one that would combine the current categories of contract costs
into one contract amount from which both direct and indirect costs would be recovered.”).
166. See id. (“Upon consolidation into a single contract amount, these cost categories
would lose their individual identities and would thereafter simply comprise the contract
total. BIA’s and IHS’s budget requests, then, would no longer contain a separate line item
for contract support; those funds would be contained within the agencies’ program line
items. BIA currently uses this funding method for tribes’ contracts of construction
programs.”).
167. See id. (“The advantage of this alternative for both the government and the tribes is
that it provides for the full recovery of indirect costs, although the amount of funding
provided may not increase. At the same time, this alternative removes any incentive for
tribes to increase their indirect costs to receive more funding each year. Funding would no
longer be provided over and above a program’s direct funding, so once the consolidated
contract amount has been set, any increases in indirect costs would leave less money for a
program’s expenditures.”).
168. Id. at 62 (“This [alternative] would create an incentive for tribes to reduce their
indirect costs as much as possible, to make more money available for direct program
expenditures. In keeping with the purpose of the Indian Self-Determination Act, tribes would
make the decisions about how much funding to spend on program costs and how much to
spend on administrative, or indirect, activities.”).
169. Id. (“With this alternative, the spotlight would no longer be on the sufficiency of
contract support funding, but on the sufficiency of direct program funding. That is, funding
debates would center on whether the funds provided for a particular program would be
sufficient to achieve its intended purpose.”).
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A disadvantage to a fixed consolidated contract price is that contracting
tribes would have to bear the burden of increased administrative and
overhead costs. 170 Instead of benefitting from the advantage of an increase
in the indirect-cost rate, tribes would have to work within the funding
limit—the contract price—to make savings on CSCs: they “would bear the
responsibility for managing indirect costs prudently, to retain the greatest
possible amount of the total contract funds for program services.” 171 While
this tribal-contractor responsibility comports with the ISDA’s selfdetermination goals, it disadvantages tribes to the extent that some of their
costs are unknown and unforeseen, and it could require tribes to take a loss
if their costs ultimately exceed the contract price.
Moreover, the consolidated contract price as a solution has another
disadvantage: it does not address the possibility of an appropriations
shortfall. Under a consolidated-cost contract, the government would not
incur liability unless it under-appropriated the consolidated figure. If even
the consolidated figure was under-appropriated, then the result of
underfunding would be the same as in Ramah—the government would
incur liability as to each contract that it underfunded when Congress
appropriated enough to satisfy any one contractor but not all collectively. 172
Thus, the consolidated-cost solution fails on its own as an effective postRamah response to the shortfall issue. Along with other reforms, however, a
consolidated-cost scheme could approach a solution that meets all of the
necessary criteria for solving the ISDA’s funding problem. 173 The next Part
discusses how the consolidated-cost approach can be combined with two
other reforms—one in the appropriations method, the other in the structure
of ISDA contracts—to further the ISDA’s self-determination policy goals
of avoiding liability for underfunding, incentivizing tribal contractors to run
programs efficiently and encouraging participation.
IV. Recommended Solutions to Strengthen the ISDA Program and Solve the
Contract Cost-Reimbursement Problem
If Congress makes no changes to the ISDA funding system following
Ramah, tribes’ CSCs could still be underfunded, but tribal contractors
would get the balance of their funds relatively quickly because the
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also infra Part IV.C (suggesting a cure to this disadvantage by shifting away
from fixed-price contracts and utilizing cost-reimbursement contracts instead).
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
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government knows it cannot escape liability for any shortfalls. 174 The BIA
and IHS could petition Congress for supplementary appropriations any time
a tribe could show a shortfall for which the government would be liable. 175
The danger for the tribes is not that shortfalls would continue, but that
Congress may decide to eliminate the entitlement to CSCs in order to save
money in the federal budget and to avoid playing catch-up for every
underfunded ISDA contract. 176 As Part III established, Congress could
change the system to avoid paying full CSCs in a number of ways:
eliminate the mandate to accept every qualifying contract, 177 eliminate the
requirement of full funding for CSCs, 178 or appropriate for ISDA contracts
on a line-item contract-by-contract basis. 179
This Part will argue for three basic reforms to the ISDA program in order
to meet the criteria set out in Part III. First, Congress should authorize the
appropriate federal agencies to engage in direct spending from the Treasury
so that the appropriations process will not be a block to funding, and
shortfalls in the ISDA contract budget will be eliminated. 180 Second,
Congress should amend the ISDA to consolidate direct program and
contract support costs, as described in Subpart III.F, allowing tribes to more
fully realize the benefits of self-determination in deciding for themselves
how to allocate contract funds to direct program costs and administrative
and overhead expenditures. 181 Finally, in implementing the consolidatedcost contract scheme, the BIA and the IHS should shift from fixed-price to
cost-reimbursement incentive-type contracts for the tribes with either an
incentive fee or an award fee to induce tribal contractors to keep costs low
and run programs efficiently. 182
A. Direct Spending Authorization for ISDA Contracts
The government funds many of its programs, particularly entitlement
programs, through direct spending: authorizing legislation allows agencies
to obligate Treasury funds before Congress appropriates money in an
annual bill. 183 Direct spending authorizations can also grant contract
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.C–D.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.A; see also supra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.B; supra Part III.F; see also supra Part II.A.
See infra Part IV.C; infra Part IV.B; see also supra Part III.F.
SCHICK, supra note 74, at 209–10.
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authority, “to incur obligations in advance of appropriations . . . .” 184 When
the budget for a contracting agency comes up for annual appropriation, the
obligated funds are beyond negotiation between Congress and the
agency. 185
The funding for public roads provides one example of how such
authorization systems work. In considering various methods of legislative
control over federal spending, Robert Ash Wallace describes the federal
highway pattern:
Congress enacts a federal-aid highway act authorizing federal
funds for highway purposes. On the strength of the authorization,
the Bureau . . . makes allotments to the States on the basis of a
formula which has been prescribed by Congress in the act. The
States agree to match the federal funds and proceed to let
contracts for the work. After the work is completed and
accepted, the federal share of the cost statement is presented to
the Bureau of Public Roads. The amount appropriated by
Congress for a particular fiscal year is based on the amount of
the cost statements that the Bureau . . . anticipates will be
presented during that period. 186
Under this scheme, Congress does not approve an anticipated cost of
building roads; rather, it receives a number for the actual costs after
performance. Although the process takes control out of the hands of
Congress, “Congress apparently feels that once the Bureau of Public Roads
makes a commitment to a State, based on the authorizing legislation, it must
honor that commitment by providing the necessary funds.” 187 Despite
concerns over prematurely committing federal funds, 188 Congress generally
considers instead the expectation interest of the States and the highway
contractors in receiving the anticipated funds for their actual
184. Id.
185. Id. at 212 (“Some entitlements (such as Social Security) have permanent
appropriations—the mandated payments are made without annual congressional action.
Most entitlement programs, however, go through the annual appropriations process,
although Congress does not really control them at this stage. If the amount appropriated is
not sufficient, Congress has to provide supplemental funds.”).
186. ROBERT ASH WALLACE, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 122
(1960).
187. Id.; see also SCHICK, supra note 74, at 209 (noting that the Highway Trust Fund is
exempted from the Congressional Budget Act’s ban on new contract authority legislation
“unless this authority is made effective only to the extent provided in appropriations acts”).
188. WALLACE, supra note 186, at 122–23 & n.2.
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expenditures. 189 Wallace characterizes this as the “moral” side of
appropriations, the rationale being that States and contractors need time for
advance planning ahead of performance and cannot be restricted by a
number set by Congress at the beginning of performance. 190 Money is
needed at the outset, but the ultimate costs are uncertain.
Such a rationale also fits the ISDA structure and policy. Congress has
promised full funding for CSCs, but these cannot be determined completely
until the tribes have performed their contracts.191 With an advance
authorization, tribes could anticipate how much they could spend on CSCs
for a given period, and, once they complete performance, the government
could reimburse them for their actual costs on the strength of the original
authorization. Furthermore, Congress need not worry about ceding control
of committing funds—they have already been committed through the ISDA
promise of full funding as demonstrated by the Ramah litigation. 192 The
direct spending authorization recognizes this promise and allows the tribes
and federal agencies to work together on a more effective contract costexpenditure plan. Congress, then, can make a reimbursing appropriation for
the amount actually spent in an appropriations bill.
Moreover, this method limits the possibility of shortfalls because tribes
will be reimbursed for their actual expenditures, not a prediction of their
potential expenditures. Thus, this funding structure would eliminate the
possibility of a Ramah-type situation—by committing Treasury funds at the
time the contract is formed—without requiring Congress to appropriate on a
line-item basis. Of the above potential solutions outlined in Part III, only
the line-item appropriation option discussed in Part III.B effectively
eliminates the possibility of Ramah-type liability because under that
scheme, tribal contractors could no longer take advantage of the Ferris
doctrine in the event of a shortfall. However, that approach is impractical
and may deter tribes from entering into new ISDA contracts if Congress
continues to underfund the program. In contrast, a direct-spending
authorization method shifts discretion from the appropriating congressional
committee to the contracting agencies negotiating with tribes. 193
Thus, the self-determination policy and the uncertain nature of CSCs
make this system attractive, not only for Congress in avoiding liability, but
also for the tribes because it takes seriously the findings of Congress in
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 123.
Id.
See supra notes 51–52, 82 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
See SCHICK, supra note 74, at 214–15.
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passing the ISDA. 194 Contract support is essential for tribes to realize their
self-determination goals. When CSC funding is lacking and tribes cannot
maintain the resources to properly administer their programs, the
beneficiaries of those programs suffer. 195 Those beneficiaries are the tribal
members who are the beneficiaries of a special trust relationship that
obligates the federal government to ensure provision of essential
services. 196
B. Consolidate Direct Program and Contract Support Costs
As described in Subpart III.F, consolidating the direct program and
contract support costs for ISDA contracts is consistent with the statute’s
self-determination goals for Indian tribes. 197 In addition, consolidation
would remove Congress’s ability to cap expenditures on CSCs with a “not
to exceed” clause in the appropriations bill. Even if Congress shifted to a
line-item appropriation, 198 a consolidated-cost contract would represent a
single negotiated contract price rather than a dichotomy between what the
secretary of the agency would otherwise have spent and indirect contract
support costs. In tandem with a direct spending authorization method,
however, the consolidated-cost contract plan approaches a more effective
solution to the ISDA’s funding problem.
Consolidating direct program costs and CSCs into one contract figure
allows tribes to determine how best to create savings in administration and
overhead. 199 Given the uncertainties of cost, however, a firm fixed price for
a consolidated ISDA contract would be difficult to calculate. Moreover,
under a fixed price scheme, contracting tribes would bear the burden of
increased indirect costs associated with overhead and administration. 200
Indeed, the ISDA contract-funding scheme has always run somewhat
counter to the self-determination theory underlying the policy. Despite
tribal “control” over the administration of various services, federal
administrators have retained significant power over the tribes because they
determine how much they would spend on a particular program. Federal
administrators are also able to limit the reimbursement of CSCs incurred by

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.F.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.F.
See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
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the tribes because of the relative deficiencies in tribal contractors’
bureaucratic size, experience, and resources.
To allow tribes to manage their contracts more freely and to eliminate
the disadvantages of the consolidated-cost structure, the government should
move away from a fixed-price-plus-CSC scheme toward a costreimbursement-type contract that includes expenses for direct programs as
well as administrative and overhead costs associated with management of
the contracts. The government can then retain the advantage of induced
efficiency under the consolidated-cost figure by negotiating costreimbursement contracts to include an incentive or award fee. The next
subpart outlines this approach.
C. Negotiate Cost-Reimbursement Incentive-Type Contracts
The ISDA provision that the amount of funds “shall not be less than the
appropriate Secretary would have otherwise provided for the operation of
[Federal Indian services] programs” 201 appears to guarantee a substantial
amount of funding. The federal government funds the ISDA, at least in part,
in reference to its trust responsibility. But the wording limits direct program
funds and forces tribes to manage their programs according to federal
determinations about methods and specifications in order to stay within the
fixed price of the contract and minimize their CSCs. This has proved
difficult for tribes because CSCs can be so uncertain. 202
The ability to determine how best to administer services owed to tribes,
under a self-determination theory, should be allocated to the contracting
tribes themselves. Thus, the government should shift from a fixed-pricebased contracting scheme to cost-reimbursement-type ISDA contracts,
which would obligate the government to reimburse any and all costs
associated with the contract and give contracting tribes the flexibility to
administer their services according to their own needs, preferences,
specifications, and cost-benefit calculations. 203
With the exception of construction contracts, the ISDA exempts its
contracts from federal government contract regulations under the Federal

201. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1) (2012).
202. See supra notes 43–46, 65–68 and accompanying text.
203. Cf. JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS 1105 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter CIBINIC & NASH, FORMATION] (noting that all
cost-reimbursement contracts allow contractors to stop performance when funds are
expended but “must continue performance as long as funds are available until completion of
the specified work.”).
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Acquisition Regulations System (“FAR”). 204 Thus, the current ISDA
funding scheme does not fit easily into the FAR’s framework of two broad
categories of government contracts: fixed-price and cost-reimbursement. 205
However, the FAR’s requirements for using cost-reimbursement contracts
are met under the ISDA. In most acquisitions, the government prefers
fixed-price contracts “[s]ince it is usually to the Government’s advantage
for the contractor to assume substantial cost responsibility and an
appropriate share of the cost risk” and “contract costs and performance
requirements are reasonably certain.” 206 Under the ISDA’s selfdetermination policy and the federal government’s trust responsibility,
however, contracting tribes should not have to assume such cost
responsibility and risks. 207 Thus, cost-reimbursement contracts are more
appropriate. 208
The FAR does not permit a cost-reimbursement contract unless
“[c]ircumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements
sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract” or “[u]ncertainties
involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with
sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.”209 Although
self-determination policy could be applied as a “circumstance” that does not
allow for a fixed-price contract, a more promising rationale would rely on
the uncertainties of past CSCs to fit the second prong of the FAR’s test for
using cost-reimbursement contracts. 210
To curb potential wasteful spending under such cost-reimbursement
contracts, the government could negotiate an incentive fee or an award fee
that would reward tribes for efficient management of their services. 211 An
204. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(a)(1) (2012). See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.101-09 (2013). Title 48
of the Code of Federal Regulations contains the Federal Acquisition Regulations System.
205. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.101 (2013) (delineating the range of government contract types).
206. 48 C.F.R. § 16.401(c) (2013).
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. See CIBINIC & NASH, FORMATION, supra note 203, at 1104 (noting that the “nature of
the work or the unreliability of the cost estimate” are the determining factors for choosing a
cost-reimbursement contract over a fixed price contract); see also JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH
C. NASH, JR., COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTING 56 (3d. ed. 2004) [hereinafter CIBINIC &
NASH, CONTRACTING] (“The [cost-plus-incentive-fee] contract is used when it is appropriate
to impose some risk on the contractor without requiring that the contractor fully assume
pricing risks.”).
209. 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.301–2(a)(1)–(2) (2013).
210. See supra notes 57–58, 82–83 and accompanying text.
211. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.405–1, 16.405–2 (2013); see also CIBINIC & NASH,
CONTRACTING, supra note 208, at 56 (“The [cost-plus-incentive-fee] contract is an objective
incentive where the parties include a formula in the contract to determine the profit earned
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incentive-fee contract rewards a contractor in proportion to the amount it is
able to stay below a target cost according to a negotiated “target cost, a
target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula.” 212
The FAR specifies that a “cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is appropriate for
services . . . when . . . [a] cost-reimbursement contract is necessary” 213—as
shown above due to uncertainties in cost 214—and when “[a] target cost and
fee adjustment formula can be negotiated that are likely to motivate the
contractor to manage effectively.” 215
Similarly, an award-fee contract motivates a contractor to manage costs
efficiently through “an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole
or in part during performance that is sufficient to provide motivation for
excellence in the areas of cost, schedule, and technical performance.” 216
With few requirements, the government has sole discretion over
determining the amount of the award fee and is responsible for carrying out
an oversight evaluation of contract performance according to predetermined
criteria. 217 Such agreements have been used primarily for service contracts,
and the award fee’s popularity as an incentive-inducing device has grown
with increased usage. 218
Either cost-reimbursement incentive or award-fee contracts could be
used to motivate tribes toward efficiency and thereby help to alleviate
congressional concerns that tribes will spend their funds wastefully. In
keeping with the ISDA’s self-determination goals, such contracts allow
tribes to determine how best to manage their costs in providing essential
services, and tribes can be rewarded for pursuing their goals with wellorganized, competent, and resourceful performance.

by the contractor based on the actual performance results achieved.”); id. at 81 (“The [costplus-award-fee] contract is used when the agency wants to include some profit motivation in
the contract but does not have sufficient information to establish firm cost, performance, or
delivery targets at the beginning of contract performance.”).
212. 48 C.F.R. § 16.405–1(a).
213. Id. § 16.405–1(b)(1); see CIBINIC & NASH, CONTRACTING, supra note 208, at 57
(noting that cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts are “particularly appropriate for services or
development and test programs, but [have] been used in many other contracting situations as
well.”).
214. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
215. 48 C.F.R. § 16.405–1(b)(1).
216. 48 C.F.R. § 16.405–2.
217. 48 C.F.R. § 16.401(b)(2)–(3).
218. CIBINIC & NASH, CONTRACTING, supra note 208, at 82.
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V. Conclusion
The federal government’s Indian self-determination program benefits
hundreds of Indian tribes and thousands of tribe members who now
participate in the control of services such as health care, education, and law
enforcement. The tribes’ self-determination goals should remain an
important priority of the federal government, which has an obligation, in
the words of the ISDA, “to respond to the strong expression of the Indian
people for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation in
the direction of educational as well as other Federal services to Indian
communities so as to render such services more responsive to the needs and
desires of those communities.” 219 Fulfilling that obligation was the promise
of the ISDA and its later-included provisions for contract support costs to
ensure that the program truly worked for the tribes and their members.
After the Ramah decision, Congress must acknowledge that the
government is liable for any shortfalls in the CSC budget. Rather than
radically limit the ISDA’s provisions and break its promises, Congress
should strengthen the self-determination program by ensuring that all
allowable CSCs are paid for.
With a direct spending authorization of contract authority for agencies,
Congress can make sure that tribes have the funding they need to provide
and administer services to their members. By consolidating direct program
and contract support costs, the government can allow tribes to determine for
themselves how to manage the funding they do receive. Finally, by utilizing
cost-reimbursement incentive-type contracts, the government can induce
tribes to manage their programs efficiently.
The recommendations in this Note are not exhaustive remedies to the
problem left after Ramah, but they are a first step toward strengthening the
government’s promise to contracting tribes and ensuring that they receive
the support they expect, to which they are entitled, and which the
government has promised to provide.

219. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) (2012).
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